Abstract: This review discusses selected work in experimental game theory. My goals are to further the dialogue between theorists and empiricists that has driven progress in economics and game theory, and to guide future experimental work. I focus on experiments whose lessons are relevant to establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation in human relationships, the role of communication in doing so, and the underlying cognition. These are questions of central importance, where the gap between theory and experience and the role of experiments in closing it both seem large. Humans appear to be unique in their ability to use language to communicate and manipulate mental models of the world and of other people, vital skills in relationships. Continuing the dialogue should help to explain why it matters for cooperation that we can communicate, and why and how it matters whether we communicate via natural language or abstract signals.
4 Eyster & Rabin's (2005) notion of cursed equilibrium focuses instead on violations of Bayesianism, but Crawford & Iriberri (2007) argue that much of the evidence they consider can be given a better and more unified explanation by considering Bayesian but non-equilibrium beliefs in level-k models. 5 It is sometimes useful to allow mixed strategies, in which players randomize over their pure, or unrandomized strategies. 6 It is the rarity in everyday life of the perfect analogies assumed in learning models that makes the protagonist Phil Connors's use of unlimited practice in the film "Groundhog Day" so striking. Experimental analysis of learning from imperfect analogies is still in its infancy, but see Rankin et al. (2000) , Van Huyck & Battalio (2002), and Cooper & Kagel (2008) . 7 "Eureka!" learning remains possible, and sometimes occurs, but can be tested for and is rare enough not to be a problem (e.g. Costa-Gomes et al. 2001 , Cooper & Kagel 2005 , or Costa-Gomes & Crawford 2006 . they rely on others' avoiding dominated strategies with much lower frequencies; still fewer subjects rely on more than one round of iterated dominance; and the presence of dominated strategies often affects outcomes even when rarely played. Systematic deviations are particularly apparent in responses to out-of-equilibrium payoffs (e.g. Goeree & Holt 2001 or Camerer 2003 .
Adding payoff-sensitive noise to equilibrium predictions, which I will call "equilibrium-plusnoise", does not adequately account for people's systematic deviations from equilibrium. Until recently the only alternative was McKelvey & Palfrey's (1995) notion of quantal response equilibrium ("QRE"; see also Rosenthal 1993) . In a QRE players' decisions are noisy with an assumed distribution, usually logit, and players best respond noisily, with a decision's density increasing in its expected payoff, taking the noisiness of others' decisions into account. This often allows QRE to fit observed behavior better than equilibrium-plus-noise. However, a QRE is a fixed point in a high-dimensional space of distributions, making its thinking justification cognitively far more demanding than for Nash equilibrium. Further, QRE's predictions are highly sensitive to its assumption about the error distribution; and the standard assumption that the distribution is logit is an untested, and probably untestable, modeling convention (Haile et al.
2008; but see Goeree et al. 2005 for counter-arguments).
Attempts to find alternatives to equilibrium-plus-noise or QRE models of strategic thinking were long held back by doubts that any model could systematically out-predict a rationalexpectations notion like equilibrium (viewed as equilibrium in beliefs), and doubts about finding a credible basis to select one of the enormous number of logically possible nonequilibrium models. In an important example of the power of experiments to break theoretical roadblocks, experiments eliciting subjects' initial responses to games may answer both doubts.
Those experiments show that most subjects find fixed-point or indefinitely iterated dominance reasoning inaccessible. Some have suggested that this is a quirk of the laboratory, and that experienced decision-makers in the field will use such reasoning when the stakes are high enough; but I have yet to find even anecdotal evidence of quants or poker experts using fixedpoint or indefinitely iterated dominance reasoning. Given the inaccessibility of such reasoning, if a game has equilibria that require it but the setting lacks the precedents for learning (which might enable them to converge to a fixed point without thinking), then subjects must find an alternative way to think about the game. The experiments I will now discuss suggest that subjects playing normal-form games tend to follow one of a simple class of "level-k" rules, described below, which imply systematic, predictable deviations from equilibrium-leading to a simple class of models that have the potential to answer both doubts for normal-form games.
The first hints that people's deviations from equilibrium might have a coherent structure came from studies of normal-form games by Nagel (1995) and Ho et al. (1998) of her/his strategic thinking. Another advantage is that two-person guessing games fully engage strategic thinking, in that subjects are not tempted to think others will treat subjects' own influences on outcomes as negligible, as they may be in n-person guessing games.
The main difficulty in analyzing data from experiments on strategic thinking is identifying subjects' decision rules within the enormous, unstructured set of logically possible rules. CGC, building on Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) , addressed this difficulty in two ways. To avoid misspecification, they created a list of possible decision rules, which included all the generalizable rules that earlier studies suggested might be empirically relevant. Those rules included the Lk and Dk rules defined above plus Equilibrium, which makes its equilibrium decision; and Sophisticated, which best responds to the observed distribution of potential partners' guesses, to test whether any subject understands others' behavior better than the specified rules. 10 CGC's econometric model assumed that each subject follows one of those rules in all 16 games, up to logit errors, and estimated by maximum likelihood which rule best fit each subject's decisions. Finally, CGC conducted a specification test, designed to detect any rules not on the specified list that describe more than one subject's guesses better than any rule on the list.
This procedure led CGC to classify 63% of the subjects as following one of the specified rules, leaving the other 37% unclassified (CGC, and that guesses could take from 200 to 800 rounded values in each game, such clear fingerprints could not plausibly happen by chance. For those 43 subjects, one can intuitively accept (pace Popper) the hypothesis that they followed their apparent rules, with error. Moreover, those rules build in risk-neutral, self-interested rationality and perfect models of the game. Thus, the high rates of exact compliance rule out alternative interpretations of behavior; and the deviations from equilibrium of the 35 subjects whose apparent rules are L1, L2, or L3 can be confidently attributed to level-k beliefs rather than irrationality, risk aversion, altruism, spite, or confusion.
(By contrast, with SW's or Crawford et al.'s (2001) coarse strategy spaces, even a perfect fit would not distinguish a subject's estimated rule from nearby omitted rules and there would be no way to rule out misspecification. In Nagel's and HCW's designs, the ambiguity is more severe.) For CGC's other 45 subjects, noisier fits require econometrics. But 31 of those 45 violated dominance less than 20% of the time (versus 38% for random guesses), suggesting that their behavior was coherent; and their estimated rules are also concentrated on L1, L2, L3, and Equilibrium, in roughly the same proportions as for the 43 subjects with clear fingerprints.
The resulting level-k model is simple, tractable, applicable to any normal-form game, and, given a calibrated or estimated distribution of k, makes precise probabilistic predictions. For a given level distribution, a level-k model predicts not only that deviations from equilibrium will sometimes occur, but also which games are likely to evoke them, the forms they are likely to take, and their frequencies. Level-k rules are decision-theoretically rational; their only departure But in a cognitive hierarchy model, Lk for k ≥ 2 need not make k-rationalizable decisions.
CGC's conclusions are generally consistent with those of other careful studies of initial responses to normal-form games. Fragiadakis et al. (2016) , for instance, stayed close to CGC's instructions and procedures and used mostly CGC's games, adding some similar guessing games.
Requiring 8/20 exact guesses rather than CGC's 7/16 (with such large strategy spaces, requiring that many exact decisions is far more stringent than usual), they classify 30% of their subjects as following one of CGC's Equilibrium, Lk, or Dk rules, in roughly the same proportions but with lower frequencies of L1 and L2 and a higher frequency of Equilibrium. To test which subjects were following other, not-yet-identified rules, they added treatments in which subjects were asked, after their initial series of decisions, to either replicate their own past choices in one treatment, or best respond to them in another. Most of their unclassified subjects fail to replicate or best respond, but their classified subjects are far more likely to do so. Conversely, their classified subjects are only 40% of those who replicate, but 68% of those who best respond.
Fragiadakis et al. also leave a large number of subjects unclassified, much as in CGC's Table 1; and they conclude that there could be significant groups of subjects who best respond but are not following one of CGC's specified rules, or who are following completely non-strategic rules.
Kneeland (2015) introduces a novel design using "ring games", which allows her to cleanly test for subjects' levels of reasoning-roughly, the highest ks for which their decisions respect krationalizability-without specifying an L0. In two-person games, varying L0 allows Lk to sweep out the set of k-rationalizable decisions, so her tests can also be viewed as tests of level-k models with unrestricted L0s. Her estimated distributions of levels of reasoning are consistent with the estimated distributions of k in previous level-k analyses. is also subject to both influences, creating a nontrivial feedback loop. Friedenberg et al. (2018) create a theoretical, epistemic framework that addresses this identification problem. In their model, a player may be strategic in the sense of having some theory about how to play the game; rational in the full epistemic sense (including belief formation; see e.g. Brandenburger 1992); or both. A rational player must be strategic, because rationality and beliefs derived from knowledge of rationality dictate play; but a strategic player need not be rational. Players are assumed to have exogenous rationality and strategic bounds, the former never higher than the latter-the model's unexplained fundamentals. In previous analyses those two bounds were implicitly set equal, but
Friedenberg et al.'s theory allows them to be identified separately. Assuming that all players are rational (but not necessarily known to be), Friedenberg et al. reanalyze Kneeland's (2015) data, finding that nearly half of the subjects she identified as having rationality (and thus strategic) bounds of 1 or 2 are now estimated to have higher strategic than rationality bounds. Further work on strategic thinking in one-shot normal-form games should strive for clearer experimental identification of subjects' decision rules and how they vary across games with the wide range of structures in applications. This will require more tests of replicability and portability, and tests of portability that build on replicability would allow clearer diagnoses of the causes of failures of portability. It will be helpful to continue substituting better experimental design for more sophisticated econometrics, by studying games for which decisions have more power to reveal cognition than in small matrix games or simple guessing games. Finally, field relevance seems to require designs that ensure that subjects understand the games they are playing, so that they will focus sharply on the problem of predicting others' responses. This is not to suggest that confusion does not happen in the field, just that uncontrolled confusion in the laboratory is not conducive to informative experiments about strategic thinking.
One-shot extensive-form games
Economists have also long been aware of deviations from subgame-perfect equilibrium in extensive-form games. For instance, Beard & Beil (1994) studied simple two-person extensiveform games in which one player has a dominated strategy, varying payoffs across treatments.
Their subjects normally made undominated decisions themselves, but relied much less on dominance for others, at rates that varied sensibly with changes in own and partner's payoffs, and with the cost a subject's decision imposed on her/his partner. Again, adding noise to subgame-perfect equilibrium predictions does not adequately account for observed behavior.
A number of experimental papers report results suggesting that, far from performing full different Centipede games, using the strategy method as is necessary to cleanly study strategic thinking in extensive-form games. They used some games like those in previous work, but also varied the structures to separate dynamic level-k models, QRE, and altruistic preferences. As usual, subgame-perfect equilibrium play is rare. There is no sign of altruistic preferences, but subjects' behavior is explained by a roughly equal mix of the level-k model and QRE.
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Other related work includes Kawagoe & Takizawa (2012) and Ho & Su (2013) , who define dynamic level-k-style learning models for extensive-form games, reminiscent of Selten's (1991) anticipatory learning and Stahl's (1996) rule learning; and show that they give credible accounts of the decision dynamics in previous Centipede and sequential bargaining experiments.
Monitoring information search, eliciting beliefs, and monitoring subject-team chats
Returning to CJ's and CGC's analyses, I now consider their uses of process data, in the form of searches for hidden but freely accessible information about the game, to study strategic thinking.
Crawford (2008) CJ's analyses are another example of how experiments with powerful designs can break theoretical roadblocks. They studied initial responses to three-period alternating-offers bargaining games, with time-discounting simulated by shrinking the size of the "pie" to be divided each period. These games have unique subgame-perfect equilibria, from which subjects' decisions deviated systematically. When they wrote, the deviations were variously attributed to subjects' cognitive limitations or to social preferences that make subjects willing to take revenge after "unfair" offers by rejecting them, even at a pecuniary cost. It was clear that both factors were important, but there was no agreement on their relative importance.
CJ's innovation was to present the games to subjects using a MouseLab interface that conceals each period's pie but allows subjects to look them up as often as desired, one at a time, while recording their searches. With low search costs, free access made the entire structure effectively public knowledge, except for privately known revenge motives that made most subjects willing to take pecuniary losses to punish unfair offers, which CJ controlled for. Given a specification of the distribution of private revenge motives, the games are simple enough to be solved by backward induction even with this asymmetry of information.
Intuitively, backward induction in CJ's design has a characteristic search pattern, in which subjects first look up the last-period pie, then the second-last, and so on, with most transitions from later to earlier periods. This claim generated pushback from theorists, because it is possible to scan the pies in any order, memorize them, and only then process them into decisions, in which case the order of look-ups will have no necessary relation to the rule being implemented.
Empirically, however, subjects using MouseLab have a strong tendency to rely on the interface as an aid to thinking, and seldom memorize. As a result, a subject's look-up order is closely related to the decision rule s/he is trying to implement. CJ supported this empirical claim by showing that a separate control group of subjects, trained in backward induction and rewarded for making their subgame-perfect equilibrium decisions, exhibited just the claimed pattern.
By contrast, untrained subjects, rewarded for their game payoffs against other untrained subjects, spent 60-75% of their time checking the first-period pie, 20-30% checking the second, and only 5-10% checking the third pie, with most transitions from earlier to later pies: the opposite of the backward-induction pattern. All subjects looked at the first-period pie at least once, but 19% never looked at the second and 10% never looked at the third. Even if those 19%
or 10% made subgame-perfect equilibrium offer or acceptance decisions-which would trigger a strong "as-if" reflex in theorists who believe economic theory should only be tested by observing decisions-they could not have been making equilibrium decisions for equilibrium reasons. And without those reasons, their equilibrium decisions in this setting give essentially no evidence that they will make equilibrium decisions in other settings.
To show that subjects' search patterns can reveal their cognition, CJ (2002) conducted a rulebased analysis of a dynamic level-k model, in which some subjects are assumed not to look ahead at all, while treating the bargaining game as an ultimatum game; others to look ahead one round, while treating it as a truncated two-stage bargaining game; and still others to look ahead the full two rounds and play their subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. (All levels' decisions were calculated taking responders' estimated average rejection behavior into account.) CJ's subjects' estimated levels were heterogeneous, with a strong positive association between the closeness of their look-up patterns to the backward-induction pattern and the closeness of their offer and/or acceptance decisions to the subgame-perfect equilibrium. CJ's results allow an evidence-based assessment of the relative importance of limited cognition and social preferences.
Their data analysis assigned them roughly equal weights-significantly more weight on limited cognition than analyses of decisions alone in alternating-offers bargaining had suggested.
CGC, within their 16 guessing games' common publicly announced structure, presented the games one by one to subjects via MouseLab, which hid both players' targets and limits but allowed subjects to look them up as often as desired, one at a time (CGC, Figure 6 , p. 1753).
Publicly announced free access to the hidden payoff parameters again made the structure effectively public knowledge; and the analysis of decisions (Section 3.1) suggests that there were no revenge motives or other distortions, so the results can be used to test theories of behavior in symmetric-information versions of the games. Almost all studies of cognition via search have followed psychology's tradition of focusing on response times and the numbers and durations of look-ups, usually aggregated across subjects and over time (e.g. Rubinstein 2007) . Like CJ and Costa-Gomes et al., CGC focused instead mainly on which look-ups subjects made at all, in which order. Because search behavior, like cognition, is highly heterogeneous, they also studied search and decisions at the individual level.
only subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game is for players to play the stage-game equilibrium every period independent of the history, however inefficient that outcome may be.
Subgame-perfect equilibria that support cooperation with infinite repetition imply an "implicit contract" that defines what it means to cooperate. Cooperation is usually enforced via threats to end the relationship if either player fails to cooperate-threats made credible by the subgameperfect equilibrium. Under weak assumptions there is a very large "Folk Theorem" set of the cooperative outcomes that are supportable in some subgame-perfect equilibrium.
As in any equilibrium analysis, players' beliefs are assumed to be focused on a particular subgame-perfect equilibrium with certainty. If the relationship lacks close precedents, as I have argued is typical in applications, players must both reach the same equilibrium via independent strategic thinking-usually without the symmetry of our favorite examples to distinguish an ideal compromise. In most equilibrium analyses there is no tolerance for error; and even trivial failures to coordinate end the relationship (exceptions include Porter 1983 , van Damme 1989 , Friedman & Samuelson 1994 , and Embrey et al. 2013 . It is clear that to be effective in real relationships, strategies must be far more robust than such equilibrium strategies. Yet theoretical work in this area focuses on characterizing the Folk Theorem set under more and more general informational assumptions, assuming subgame-perfect, sequential, or perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Experimental work on cooperation in repeated games in economics began with Roth & Murnighan (1978) on the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Selten & Stoecker (1986) on the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The literature is very large, and I will discuss only some promising recent work. Dal Bó & Fréchette (2018) and Embrey et al. (2018) survey the experimental literatures on the infinitely and finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma respectively.
The papers I discuss all focus on the symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma and consider learning as well as initial responses, although I focus on the latter. They are distinguished by their use of datasets and/or meta-datasets from experiments with widely varying payoff structures, and also by their openness to the need for strategies to be robust. Their analyses replace the customary assumption that any subgame-perfect equilibrium is a possible outcome with simple criteria that use the tools of equilibrium analysis but do more justice to the strategic uncertainty subjects face in their need to coordinate on some cooperative outcome that is consistent with their incentives.
In the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Dal Bó & Fréchette (2011) That said, these studies' criteria leave a substantial fraction of cooperation unexplained.
Further, although the symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma is a sensible place to start, it may make coordination on cooperative outcomes unrepresentatively easy. Future work should try to extend these analyses to asymmetric repeated games without obvious ideal solutions, seeking criteria that reflect the difficulties asymmetrically situated subjects face.
Finally, establishing and maintaining cooperation is cognitively taxing, and a full understanding will require studying cognition at the individual level. Breitmoser (2015) These analyses have only begun to gather the empirical knowledge needed for a better theory of cooperation in repeated games. 13 But this may well be another case where experiments help to break a theoretical roadblock. Methods like those discussed in Section 3.3 may also be useful.
13 Crawford (2002, pp. 8-10; 2016, p. 142 ) discusses another puzzle, which highlights the use of repeated-game strategies for what Camerer et al. (2002) called "strategic teaching", whereby subjects who interact repeatedly with the same partners deviate from their myopically optimal decisions to try to influence their partners in ways that will benefit them in the future. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This review has discussed selected recent work in experimental game theory, with particular attention to experiments whose lessons are relevant to establishing and maintaining cooperation in human relationships and the role of communication in doing so. These are questions of central importance, where the gap between theory and experience and the role of experiments in closing it both seem large. I hope that continuing the dialogue between theory and experiment in this 17 Gentzkow et al. ( in press 2019) discuss how analyzing natural-language text differs from analyzing more conventional kinds of data and gives an overview of econometric methods and applications. A typical analysis using the methods they discuss begins by editing the data to reduce dimensionality, then using the data to predict the unknown variables of interest, and then using the predictions much as one would use standard data. Their discussion includes causal inference as well as prediction.
